Abstract
The present work is an analysis of the function of conflict in Spinoza's ethical-political thought, starting from the way indignatio is defined and evaluated in the third and fourth part of the Ethics and the role of the hate motions of the multitudo in the Political Treaty. We will highlight a tension in the passage from the ethical-metaphysical work to the more distinctly political one, where the author takes on all the consequences of assuming as unavoidable and constitutive the presence, in the state, of inadequate desires marked by contrary, we will define what value - of usefulness and harmfulness - Spinoza assigns to indignation in the sphere of interhuman relations and in the political forum. This path helps us to identify two ways of the conflict ascribed to his political theory: on one hand, regulating conflict of the institution’s activities and of the sovereignty; on the other hand, given in the event of deep corruption, constituent conflict as capable of radical transformations in a deeply corrupted situation. More specifically, we will try to emphasize the combinatorial status of affective life to look at the constitution of a new state. To do so, we will avoid reducing it to isolated affects of opposition and, at the same time, the absolute exclusion of a contribution of indignation and of discord in the transition from one political and institutional organization to another.