

Scienza e Pace

Science & Peace

ISSN 2039-1749

VOL. XIII, N. 2 (2022)

**For a just and lasting peace in Ukraine:
“Development is the new name for peace”**

Stefano Zamagni

Rivista online del Centro Interdisciplinare
“Scienze per la Pace” – Università di Pisa



Articolo presentato su invito del Direttore

Ricevuto: 1 marzo 2023.

Accettato: 10 aprile 2023.

Per citare il *paper*:

Zamagni, S. (2022), “For a just and lasting peace in Ukraine: ‘Development is the new name for peace’”, *Scienza e Pace*, XIII, 2, pp. 1-21.

I contenuti di “Scienza e Pace” sono rilasciati sotto licenza
Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0



For a just and lasting peace in Ukraine: 'Development is the new name for peace'

Stefano Zamagni *

Abstract

Starting from the famous sentence by pope Paul VI (1967): “Development is the new name for peace”, the paper argues that a credible and effective strategy to achieve peace in the Ukraine war as well as in the other 168 wars being fought in the world, today, is to build up new institutions of peace, both in the political and in the economic arenas. Meanwhile, the paper advances a concrete proposal to arrive, in a short time, at a peace negotiation that is credible and enforceable. The spirit of the paper is the same as the one crystallized in the Erasmus’s sentence: “It is better an unfair peace to a fair war”.

Key words: Ukraine war, Pacifism, Warmongering, Peace Building, UN Charter, Peace Negotiations.

Abstract

Partendo dalla famosa affermazione di papa Paolo VI, “lo sviluppo è il nuovo nome della pace”, l'articolo sostiene che una strategia credibile ed efficace per raggiungere la pace nella guerra in corso in Ucraina, così come nelle altre 168 guerre che si stanno combattendo nel mondo oggi, occorre costruire nuove istituzioni, sia nell'arena politica che in quella economica. In questo quadro viene avanzata una proposta concreta per arrivare, in tempi brevi, a un negoziato di pace credibile e attuabile. Lo spirito di questo lavoro è lo stesso cristallizzato nel motto di Erasmo: “Meglio una pace ingiusta che una guerra giusta”.

Parole chiave: Guerra in Ucraina, Pacifismo, Bellicismo, Peacebuilding, Carta delle Nazioni Unite, Negoziati di pace

* Stefano Zamagni is currently Adjunct professor at the University of Bologna.

Introduction and motivation

Russia's armed intervention in Ukraine constitutes the tenth major episode of the new era of war, which began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. (There are 169 wars in the world today!) Two elements characterise this new era. The first is that the end of the Cold War diverted the West from its commitments to the poor countries of the South, once the risk of the spread of Sovietism in those countries had disappeared. This helps to understand why the current war is the first war of a global nature and not the third world war. The difference is clear. Whereas a world war spreads its direct negative consequences only among the belligerent countries, a global war is such when the consequences also affect third countries that have no part in the conflict. Today's case of food shortages due, not to the physical lack of food, but to the blockade of maritime and land traffic, is just one example, the one that is surprising the public the most. With the blockade of grain and fertilisers, hunger is strategically planned to take hold in other countries, as a weapon to bring about migrations from African countries to the EU, which is not at war. The same applies to energy. Ukraine's resistance to Russia's invasion crystallizes how technology is transforming geopolitics. The present one is the first digitally networked war. Putin has learned the hard way that it is unwise to start a twentieth-century war in the twenty-first century. The world endures heightened uncertainty, disrupted supply chains and dire risks of nuclear escalation.

The second element is that, until recent years, globalisation had never been thought of in situations of war. Indeed, if there was a widespread belief among scholars and opinion-makers, it was that globalisation, even with its aporias, served the cause of peace. For example, the influential essay by the British economist Robert Cooper (2000) defends the thesis that the post-modern society, the beginning of which is associated with the advent of the globalisation process that started with the G6 *summit* in November 1975 at the Chateau de Rambouillet (Paris), is an inherently peaceful society. The events of the last thirty years have taken it upon themselves to make us realise a truth that should have been seen long ago, namely that globalisation is a positive-sum game that increases both overall income and wealth, but at the same time increases social inequalities both between countries and between social classes within the same country, no matter how rich. Hence the impetus for the outbreak of armed conflicts. This issue was lucidly understood by H. Arendt when she wrote in her well-known essay *On Violence* (1969): 'Anger is by no means an automatic reaction to misery and suffering as such. No one reacts with anger to an incurable disease and an earthquake or to social conditions that seem immutable. It is only where there is

reason to suspect that conditions might change and do not change that anger is triggered' (p. 67).

The point now raised deserves a brief elaboration. Referring back to an earlier idea of Erasmus of Rotterdam (1503), Montesquieu, in his famous *The Spirit of the Laws*, (1750) writes: 'The natural effect of trade is to bring peace because two nations that trade become mutually dependent'. Along the same lines of thought is Hirschman (1977): after correctly noting that market societies are founded on interests, whereas ancient and feudal societies were founded on passions, he concludes by stating that capitalism tends to make the world more peaceful, since self-interested and rational subjects have no convenience in making war on each other. (A few years earlier, Bertrand Russell, who was openly against the economic mainstream, had written that if men were truly self-interested, they would never go to war, to signify that the celebrated metaphor of *homo oeconomicus* is without empirical foundation).

An opposite thesis is that of Antonio Genovesi, the founder of the civil economy paradigm and the world's first university professor of economics (Naples 1753). In his *Lezioni di Economia Civile* (1765) we read: 'The great source of war is commerce. Trade is jealousy and jealousy arms men'. And in the truly remarkable essay, *La logica per i giovanetti* (1766), Genovesi goes so far as to write: 'A fourth principle of civil economy is: it is necessary for a people to depend on others as little as possible. An admirable maxim, which alone has magnified the English and will soon magnify the Portuguese, who have taken it on all sides. The more a people depends on others, the poorer and more enslaved it is; the more miserable, the more disheartened. This principle has not been understood to its full extent precisely for lack of good philosophers to enlighten the public. There is a beautiful country in Italy that has long been accustomed to living over others. If it does not awaken, now that everyone wants to live by itself and for itself, it will in no time at all pity mankind as much as it has done at other times" (p. 21). The war in Ukraine, of which we are sad spectators, must force us to admit that Genovesi was right! In essence, we must avoid being hostages to energy supplies from countries that use it as a weapon of political blackmail (See Clò, 2022).

It is interesting to refer to the position of I. Kant who in his *Perpetual Peace* (1795) draws attention to the ease of financing wars through the system of international payments: 'A system of credit within which debts grow indefinitely [...] is a dangerous monetary power. This model of organisation [...] actually constitutes a treasury intended for war. These resources to pay for war, combined with the inclination towards them of those who govern - an inclination that seems implanted

in human nature - is a great obstacle to perpetual peace (quoted in R. Triffin, 'How world entered inflation, in Masera, Triffin, eds., 1984).

What is the meaning of the above? That trade only promotes peace if the gains from it are equally divided. Otherwise, the country that sees its economic position worsening will tend to use force to obtain some distribution of the gains from trade. This was already understood by J.S. Mill when he made it clear in his *Principles of Political Economy* (1848) that 'gains from trade' are always associated with 'pains from trade'. Yet subsequent developments in official economic thought have never wanted to consider the implications of this. With a few exceptions, the most notable of which is that of T. Schelling, who in his famous *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960), showed how the choice of the war option is always the result of the simultaneous presence of two elements: a specific reason (population discontent; frustration; insecurity; strong identity drive) and the perception that the use of violence is capable of changing the situation in one's favour.

In what follows, I will first shed light on the illusory attempt by Putin's Russia to give an ideological justification to the war in Ukraine. I will then go on to address the reasons put forward by the pacifist instance for the ongoing conflict. In section 4, I will defend the thesis effectively rendered by the adage '*Si vis pacem, para civitatem*'. (If you want peace, prepare institutions of peace), focusing on those institutions of peace that, in today's conditions, I consider most urgent to build. Finally, I will put forward a proposal, which I consider plausible and effective, to arrive, in a short time, at a peace negotiation.

1. The pseudo-motivations of war

In a fallacious attempt to justify this war, the Russian leadership evokes the so-called collective West (USA and Western Europe) in order to stigmatise it, attributing neo-colonialist aspirations, especially towards Eastern Europe, and turn it into a military target. The accusation is not new; it is found, for example, in a sort of catechism compiled by a well-known pro-Putin journalist with the title "Brief Catechesis of the Russian Man" (*Trimarium*, Dec. 2017, taken up by *Limes*, in its December 2017 issue). Three main points define the 'Putin doctrine'. Firstly, Ukraine would never have had its own identity and statehood before the October Revolution; secondly, Ukraine received resources, concessions and favours of various kinds from the USSR; third, Ukraine was allegedly ruled by a clique of neo-Nazis. The essay 'About the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians' published

by Putin in July 2021 states that Ukraine as an autonomous entity was an invention of the 'Bolshevik policy of nationalities at the expense of historical Russia'.

As Dell'Asta (2022), demonstrated these are false assertions. Especially the third one is devoid of any foundation. The 'Putin doctrine' has among its intellectual reference points Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), a Russian philosopher and author of an unspecified Russian-Christian fascism who, after his expulsion from the USSR in 1922, dazzled by the figure of Mussolini, wrote a voluminous apologia for political violence. The thesis he defended was that the 'white spirit' of Russia was supposed to animate the extreme right-wing political forces in Europe. This gives an account of why, since 2013, the Kremlin has provided support of various kinds to populist and sovereignist European parties that were convinced of the moral and spiritual 'decadence' of the European Union (for details, see Snyder, 2018).

To be precise, the cultural roots of Russian politics run even deeper. The great poet Alexander Pushkin predicted in 1836 that Russia would always follow a different path from the rest of Europe. 'Our destiny was then to protect ourselves from the Mongols, and then to become an authoritarian regime ourselves'. (The reference is to Genghis Khan who invaded Kiev in 1228 and remained there for two and a half centuries). A giant of literature like Fyodor Dostoyevsky goes so far as to say: 'There is only one truth and only one people can have a true God. The only people bearing God are the Russians' (Jangfeldt, 2022). The last Russian emperor, Nicholas II, had the title Tsar of Kiev, which suggests that while Ukraine has its own national identity, Russia is, rather, a political entity. At the core of Russian culture is not a sense of belonging to a particular identity, but a sense of reverence for a sovereign power, i.e. an effective system of authoritarian power and government. Which is what Putin is doing, convinced as he is, that it is power as potency - not power as influence - that ensures both order and the administration of justice. This is the reason why Putin enjoys the support both of the population and of most intellectuals. (It is a well known fact that those who love democracy, on the other hand, distrust power as potency and seek to limit it instead).

The fact is that Russia has missed three crucial steps of European modernisation (Marini, 2020). First, of all, it has never experienced the Reformation and Enlightenment of the French, Scottish, or Italian kind. It has not had the bourgeois civilisation that, in Western Europe, helped lay the foundations of the Constitutional State. Secondly, Russia has always been an empire, not a nation-state (which can generate an empire) and therefore autocracy is its natural mode of government. Finally, Russia has never known the model of liberal capitalism that characterised the market economy of Western Europe. Rather, its own is a patrimonial

capitalism, the hallmark of which is the figure of the oligarch. In truth, Peter the Great understood this and tried to bring Russian popular culture up to date, but did not have enough time. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 understood the urgency of a radical cultural transformation, launching the idea of the New Man, but with little result for a variety of reasons. Robert Cooper (2003) called Russia a 'modern pre-modern state'. The position expressed by Putin in the famous *Financial Times* interview of 26 June 2019 with L. Barber is eloquent in this regard: "The liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the vast majority of the population [...]. Traditional values are more stable and more important to millions of people than the liberal idea, which, for me, has ceased to exist".

In the light of the above, it is easy to understand the meaning of Patriarch Kirill's iconic statement: "We are engaged in a struggle that is not physical, but metaphysical". But the metaphysics Kirill refers to is certainly not that of Florensky, Bulgakov and others. For the religious ideology of the 'Russian World' (*Russkij Mir*), has 'a transnational Russian sphere or civilisation, called Holy Rus', which includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus'. The 'Russian World' possesses a common political centre (Moscow); a common spiritual centre (Kiev); a common language; a common Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) that operates under a common leader (today, Putin) to govern this world in order to bring back the project of ancient Rus'. (It should be noted that the ancient Rus' population was of Scandinavian origin, not Slavic, as it is still made out to be). It is of interest, in this regard, to report the 13 March 2022 statement by three hundred Orthodox theologians and intellectuals from the Orthodox Christian Studies Center at Fordham University in New York on the ideology of the 'Russian World'. "The support of much of the Moscow Patriarchate for President Vladimir Putin's war is rooted in Orthodox, totalitarian religious fundamentalism known as *Russkij Mir* - a false teaching that appeals to many in the Orthodox Church and is also embraced by certain segments of Catholic and Protestant fundamentalism." (It should be remembered that the principle of organisation on the basis of ethnicity in the Orthodox Church was condemned already by the Council of Constantinople in 1872. What is practised today in Russia is therefore a mere heresy).

Nevertheless the ideological-identitarian explanation - the features of which have just been mentioned - is not sufficient to account for the invasion of 24 February 2022. It is necessary to take into account the so-called realist component, according to which Putin decided to wage war to prevent Ukraine from being drawn into the Western orbit and joining NATO. As a reminder, in 1994, Ukraine and Russia had signed the Budapest Memorandum, a treaty in which Ukraine pledged

to divest itself of its nuclear arsenal in exchange for the protection of its borders, including Crimea and the Donbass. While Ukraine respected the pact, the same cannot be said of Russia. Several years later, in the winter of 2013, Kiev decided not to sign up for EU membership and at the same time entered into negotiations with Moscow to sign an economic-financial agreement deemed more advantageous. As we know, this resulted in a serious rift in the country between the two factions, those in favour of EU membership and those in favour of the pact with Moscow. The Donbass, with an ethnic Russian majority, then proclaimed its independence with the full support of Russia. Thus began a war, never declared, between the regular Ukrainian army and the separatist army: in eight years, 14,000 people were killed and one and a half million citizens left the country, of whom nine hundred thousand took refuge in Russia.

The following year, in 2014, Henry Kissinger wrote an editorial for the 'New York Times' in which he said: 'The European Union must recognise that its bureaucratic expansion and the subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine's relationship with Europe helped turn a negotiation into a crisis'. The negotiation then entered into force in September 2017. The aim, for the EU, was not just to open a market for its goods in Ukraine, but also to extend the association formula to other countries in the region such as Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. This explains the 2014 territorial annexations by Russia. Guiltily, the West underestimated the risk of conflict that would ensue, partly because they did not want to understand or take seriously what Putin said at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, when he seriously questioned the lawfulness of the post-1989 world order. However, this is not the only error of judgement committed by the West. Far more serious was the error made in the aftermath of the fall of the USSR when Western policy-makers and economists advised (so to speak) President Yeltsin to promptly initiate the liberalisation of the economy before the necessary constitutional reforms. This is how Yeltsin was 'persuaded' to approve the *shock therapy*, which resulted in the deaths of so many people and generated heavy discontent among the population. Yet even a non-expert, if intellectually honest, can understand that it is democracy, with its institutions, that comes before the market. The reason is that without the support of a viable and well-organised civil society, the market becomes a jungle. It is a known fact that the so-called 'Lipset's law', named after the British political scientist who in the 1970s ruled that it is the institutions of the market economy that lead towards democracy, has been empirically disproven, with the sole exception of the case of South Korea.

I would like to conclude with another significant episode, The 'Joint Declaration between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the New

Phase of International Relations' published on 4 February 2020. It reads: "The parties call on all states to pursue prosperity for all and, to this end, call for dialogue and mutual trust, valuing universal values such as peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom, respecting the rights of peoples to determine the development processes of their countries and sovereignty independently. They also call upon all states to respect the international architecture led by the United Nations; to seek genuine multipolarity with the United Nations and its Security Council; and to promote more democratic international relations, ensuring peace, stability and sustainable development throughout the world. (...) The parties share the assumption that democracy is a universal human value, and not a privilege of a limited number of states, and that its promotion and protection is a common responsibility of the entire world community". The fact that such a broad statement is in blatant pragmatic contradiction with Russia's decision to invade Ukraine only two years later needs no comment. A valuable discussion of the relationship between religions and international disorder in the 21st century can be found in Graziano (2019).

2. Overcoming the warmongering-pacifist dualism

What is the connection between the tragic events in Ukraine and the pacifist demand for peace? Can pacifism really offer a lasting way out of war? The traditional pacifism of the 20th century - known as ethical or testimonial pacifism - is unable, on its *own*, to advance the cause of peace today. It will continue to remain an option of the individual conscience, worthy of the highest legal protection and the broadest social consideration, but the preservation of peace on earth demands much more than that in the present historical conditions.

The 'official' date of the beginning of the non-violent movement is generally considered to be on 11 September 1906, when Gandhi declared himself ready to accept death in order not to submit to unjust law in Johannesburg. Gandhi's idea of pacifism is very noble, when it is declined at the level of the individual person ready to sacrifice himself for peace. But one must be warned of the perverse consequences it can give rise to in macro contexts, so to speak. For instance, it is well known that Gandhi argued that the Jews should have surrendered to the Nazis by trying to arouse their mercy. It is easy to conjecture how many more victims the Holocaust would have claimed. Another fundamental landmark of ethical pacifism is the famous speech on 'Security is the antithesis of peace' that Dietrich Bonhoeffer delivered in August 1934 in Fanøe, Denmark. The Protestant theologian's central idea was that in order to achieve peace, one must risk it. He

wrote: 'How will we achieve peace? Through a system of political conferences? Through the investment of large amounts of capital in the various countries? Or through universal peaceful rearmament for the purpose of security and peace? No, none of this because that is how peace and security are misunderstood. There is no peace if one thinks of security. That is why peace must be risked; it is the greatest of risks and can never be secure [...]. Peace means entrusting oneself completely to prayer, not wanting any security but, on the contrary, leaving the history of peoples in God's hands" (Bonhoeffer, 2002). We are well aware of how Bonhoeffer would later modify this clear-cut position of his by actively participating in the resistance struggle against Nazism, which would later cause his death on 9 April 1945. The Lutheran theologian's statement after the change of line remains famous: "If a madman throws his car onto the pavement, I cannot, as a pastor, content myself with burying the dead, singing in Gregorian chant and consoling the relatives. I must catch the driver at his wheel and stop him" (*Sic!*). Never forget that the pacifists of the 1930s helped Hitler to impose himself in his country, certainly against their intentions. Pacifism also sometimes tends to enlist the Kant of *For Perpetual Peace* among its supporters. But this does not correspond to the truth. Indeed, we read in that essay: 'No state should intrude by force into the constitution and government of another state'. And Kant indicated as a further condition for perpetual peace that the civil constitution of every state should be republican, by which he meant a form of government other than despotism, and in which there is an effective division of powers, and a real application of the rule of *law* instead of the *rule by law*. Russia does not fulfil these conditions at all.

Why is the pacifism of surrender, which is willing to give up freedom and accept abuse in order to achieve peace, and does not consider that peace without freedom is a graveyard, not a plausible, let alone morally acceptable option? (Bear in mind that invaders always say they want peace because this is a way of overpowering the victims). There are two main reasons. The first is external to pacifism: both the causes and the nature of war have changed. John Paul II led the small group of those who first understood this fact. With the perspicacity that distinguished him, in the Angelus prayer of 1 January 2002, he declared: "Negative forces forged by perverse interests aim at making the world into a theatre of war". These disturbing words not only smack of prophecy, but of a political indictment that call into question the notion of 'structures of sin' that Pope Paul VI had elucidated in his encyclical *Populorum progressio* (1967), further elaborated by John Paul II in his encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987).

The notion of 'structures of sin' roughly corresponds to the notion of unintended consequences of intentional action elaborated by the Scottish Enlightenment

scholars in the 18th century and later taken up by F. von Hayek: there are situations, in the economic sphere, in which many individuals, though individually animated by noble intentions and sentiments, take actions that intertwine with each other in the market arena, generating, perverse results at an aggregate level, that none of the individual agents had foreseen, let alone desired. If peace is the fruit of justice, the question is then whether the reason for peace or the reason for justice is stronger. War is a grave sin, the pope reminds us, "but so is the perpetuation of injustice". The economic and social destiny of individual countries and peoples can no longer be ignored and treated instrumentally - a point that J. Maritain had already made very clear in his speech to UNESCO in 1947 entitled 'La voie de la paix'.

The second of above-mentioned reason concerns, on the other hand, traditional pacifism itself, which today seems afflicted by a sort of paradox: on the one hand, it needs war to claim peace; on the other, it reacts very tepidly, to the point of ignoring the myriad conflicts that involve 'marginal' populations, which then pave the way for a fully-fledged war. The war itself is not called into question, but individual wars are denounced instead, the 'local' causes of which are sought. As Albertini (1984) wrote, testimonial pacifism cultivates "the dream of eliminating war without destroying the world of war" (p.17). This is why there is an urgent need to move quickly towards a new pacifism, which I call institutional pacifism and whose slogan is: *if you want peace, prepare institutions of peace. ('si vis pacem, para civitatem')*.

A final consideration to conclude on this point. The arms race and war are an absolute evil, but the right to legitimate defence must be ensured, because it is not ethically permissible to remain indifferent or equidistant between aggressor and aggressed, unless one adopts the ethics of conviction (in Max Weber's sense) which, contrary to the ethics of responsibility, declares absolute loyalty to an ideal (peace) to be achieved at all costs, regardless of historical circumstances. When then is defence lawful and therefore legitimate? We owe to Thomas Aquinas the first explicit answer to this question. Three conditions must be met and all of them are verified in the Ukrainian case. First, the legitimacy of the authority conducting the defensive war.

Second, a just cause. Third, a just purpose. Aquinas' position was later taken up and refined by Holmes (1989) with his distinction between *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*. Lenin (1966) also declared himself in favour of defensive warfare, even going so far as to write in his *Socialism and War* that "in history there have many times been wars which, despite all the horrors, have been progressive and useful to the

evolution of mankind” (p.273). At any rate, the present writer stays with Erasmus of Rotterdam when he wrote: “It is better an unfair peace to a fair war” (1503).

3. A way to peace building

What does it mean to be peacemakers (“Blessed are the peacemakers”, Mt.5,9) in today's historical conditions? It means finally taking seriously the proposition of *Populorum Progressio* (1967) that “development is the new name for peace”. There are three theses that give this statement all its prophetic force. First, peace is possible, since war is an event, not a state of affairs. Which means that war is a transitory emergency, however long it may be, not a permanent condition of the society of humans. Therefore “political realists” are not correct in saying that, in the international arena, only the strength and calculation of the interests at stake counts, since war would be inevitable in any case, given Hobbes iconic statement that *homo homini lupus* (every man is a wolf to another man). The second thesis, however, states that peace, must be built, since it is not something that germinates spontaneously, regardless of the will of people. In a book of great relevance, which is scarcely cited, by Wright (1942) we read that 'never have two democracies made war on each other'. This is indeed so, as history confirms. Therefore, if we really want peace, we must work to extend the culture and practice of the democratic principle everywhere.

In this regard, it is worth noting certain stylised facts that characterise our times. Consider the disturbing phenomenon of hunger and malnutrition. It is not a new and tragic circumstance but what makes it scandalous and intolerable today, is the fact that it is not the consequence of an inability of the global production system to ensure food for all. It is not a global scarcity of resources that causes hunger and deprivation. It is rather an 'institutional failure', i.e. the lack of adequate, economic and legal institutions that is the main factor responsible for this. Consider the following events. The extraordinary increase in economic interdependence, which has taken place over the last quarter century, means that large segments of the population can be adversely affected in their living conditions by events taking place even in quite distant locations over which they have no power to intervene. (These are the so-called pecuniary externalities). Thus, the well-known 'depression famines' are now joined by 'boom famines', as Amartya Sen has been documenting extensively for so long. Moreover, the expansion of the market area as a result of globalisation - a phenomenon that is in itself positive - means that the ability of one social group to access food crucially depends, on the decisions of other social groups. For example, the price of a primary commodity (coffee, cocoa,

etc.), which constitutes the main source of income for a certain community, may depend on what happens to the price of other products independently of a change in the production conditions of the first commodity.

There is another stylised fact that I would like to mention briefly. The relationship between people's nutritional status and their ability to work influences both the way food is shared among family members - especially between males and females - and the way the labour market works. The poor only possess labour potential; to turn it into effective labour power, the person needs adequate nutrition. Therefore, without proper help, the malnourished cannot fulfil this condition in a free market economy. The reason is simple: the quality of labour the poor person is able to offer in the labour market is insufficient to 'command' the food necessary to live decently. As modern nutritional science has shown, 60% to 75% of the energy a person gets from food is used to keep the body alive; only the remainder can be used for work or other activities. This is why real 'poverty traps' can happen in poor societies and why they are destined to last for long periods of time.

What conclusion can we draw from the above? That the acknowledgement of a strong link between 'institutional failures' on the one hand, and increasing global inequalities on the other, reminds us that institutions are not - like natural resources - a fact of nature, but rules of the economic game that are set by politics. If hunger depended on a situation of absolute scarcity of resources, as was the case until the early 20th century, there would be nothing to do but call for fraternal compassion or solidarity. Knowing, on the other hand, that it depends on rules, i.e. on institutions that are partly obsolete and partly unjust, cannot but lead us to intervene in the mechanisms and procedures by virtue of which those rules are set and enforced.

The third and final thesis, states that peace is the result of works aimed at creating institutions of peace, i.e. rules of the game, specifically targeted at integral human development. Situations such as the war in Ukraine are described in social science as 'collective action problems', i.e. problems in which each participant has a long-term interest in cooperating, but a strong short-term incentive to act opportunistically. This is why institutions are needed to change individual short-term incentives, if one wants to avoid resorting to the Leviathan. The philosopher H.L Hart distinguished "primary rules", i.e. the basic rules of co-habitation, from "secondary rules" (the rules for setting rules). Well, the current international legal system has only primary rules and therefore generates 'primitive' laws (and regulations), which do not ensure peace.

Which peace institutions then deserve priority attention in today's conditions? First, the repudiation of war as a means of conflict resolution needs to be made credible by providing effective means to defend the aggressed. In this regard, the UN Charter must be amended in the sense of cancelling the right of veto hitherto granted to the permanent members of the Security Council. Granting one subject the right of veto is in fact tantamount to granting a monopoly right, which is morally unacceptable. Secondly, an (independent) International Aid Management Agency (IAMA), must be created within the UN Universe, to which the resources made available by the 'peace dividend' and other should flow, and which, by virtue of the principle of subsidiarity (circular), operates as a grant-making body. (If only 10% of global military expenditure, amounting to some \$1.7 trillion annually, were diverted to IAMA, the current structural inequalities could be redressed within a decade). Clearly, the governance structure of IAMA must be that of a multi-stakeholder body; that is, representatives of the various stakeholders, in particular of the more than 7,000 non-governmental organisations registered with the UN, must sit on its board. Thirdly, it is necessary to radically revise the structure of the political-legal institutions created at Bretton Woods in 1944 (IMF, WHO, World Bank, WTO), which have become obsolete because they were designed for a world that no longer exists. At the same time, it is necessary to work towards the creation of two other institutions, endowed with the same powers as those that already exist: a World Organisation for Migration (WMO) and a World Environment Organisation (WEO).

A fourth urgent initiative is the design of a new sanctions regulation. In his recent book, Mulder (2022), reconstructs the history of economic sanctions and explores their limits. The idea of waging war by economic means is an old one (siege, naval blockade, etc.), but today economic deterrence no longer works to prevent conflicts or to bring them to an end. Firstly, because they are a double-edged sword, since they also harm those who introduce them. Secondly, because the more they are used, the more they lose their effectiveness, as countries adapt to resist them. Thirdly, because for sanctions to be effective, they postulate fair agreement between the sanctioning countries, i.e. the absence of free-rider behaviour. Everyone knows that there are belligerent lobbies that do not want conflicts to end. In particular, they push to block any proposal for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine: the profits of the arms industry are too high. A rigorous analysis of the main passages of the long history behind the war in Ukraine is that of Cella (2021). (see the Rand Corporation Report of April 2022, *Overextending and imbalancing Russia. Assessing the impact of cost-imposing options*).

Finally, there is an urgent need to get a plan off the ground for the balanced reduction of armaments and especially to stop the proliferation of nuclear warheads. The world's military expenditure is about two trillion dollars a year, almost 10% more than a decade ago. This is to expand the ATT, the Treaty on the International Trade in Conventional Arms, approved in 2013 and ratified in 2020 by the EU and China, but not by US and Russia! The UN Convention on Autonomous Weapon Devices (LAWS: *Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems*) ended in Dec. 2021 with nothing. Yet it is known that in the past all spiralling arms races have ended in disastrous conflicts. That is why the proposal to start negotiations among all countries to reduce annual military expenditure in a balanced manner (say by 2%) should be welcomed. Finally, the 10th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference ended in August 2022, albeit with a nullity, as a result of the irrevocable Russian 'no' - a Russian position criticised even by its ally China. A credible proposal must envisage the creation of a global fund to allow the buy-back and destruction of conventional weapons. It would be funded by the resources freed up by reducing military expenditure. The benefits for poor countries would be considerable: they would get fresh resources to finance their development with the only condition of not buying back weapons. Russia is the world's second largest arms exporter after the US, even though it knows that selling arms to poor countries means slowing down their development process and encouraging war between the poor. (As P. Chekhov famously wrote: "If a gun appears in a novel, it must be fired!").

It should be known that the above is technically possible in all respects. Rather, what is lacking is the will to act in that direction. Very appropriately, Card. Pietro Parolin – the Vatican's Secretary of State - wrote: "Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that we have not been able to build, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new system of coexistence between nations, which would go beyond military alliances or economic convenience. The ongoing war in Ukraine makes this defeat evident" (*Vatican News*, 11 March 2022). I would like to stress one point here. It is certainly true that 'the collective West' (and NATO) failed to anticipate, let alone foresee, what has happened since 24 February 2022. And it is also true that the West has done too little to build 'a new system of coexistence between nations. But all this can in no way justify the military offensive in Ukraine; if anything, it can explain it, certainly not justify it, neither politically nor ethically. The fact remains that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a moral outrage.

4. A credible proposal for peace negotiations

While reiterating the relevance of the above considerations, I believe that in the meantime a proposal for peace negotiations between the two belligerent countries must be put forward, although it might take some time, given the nature of the measure. The aim of the negotiations cannot be limited to achieving negative peace in the sense of J. Galtung who, as early as 1975, introduced the distinction, which later became famous, between negative peace and positive peace. Later, in collaboration with C. Jacobson, Galtung published the volume, *Searching for peace* (2000). While the former refers to the absence of direct violence ('to the cease-fire', as they say), the latter lays down the conditions for attacking the *causes* of war. Indeed, only positive peace is sustainable in terms of duration. Yet, it is the notion of negative peace that continues to be invoked and sought after. For example, it is to this type of peace that the Global Peace Index (GPI), drawn up by the Institute for Economics and Peace in Sydney, refers as its conceptual basis. This is a serious gap that needs to be filled, and quickly.

The war in Ukraine is likely to evolve into a war of attrition and may end either as a frozen conflict or as a negotiated peace. It has been proven that a negotiated peace is always a superior outcome to the other possibility. And this is true not only for Russia and Ukraine, but also for the US, the EU and the rest of the world. For an accurate demonstration, also of an empirical nature, I refer to Blattman, (2022), a Canadian economist. Just consider what is happening to the price of natural gas in Europe (Russia's natural gas reserves amount to 37 Billion m³; the EU's to just over 3 Billion m³) and to the disruption of global value chains through which countries exchange goods and services with each other. (Italy imports more than 35% of the gas it needs from Russia, as well as large quantities of wheat, oilseeds, and fertilisers for its agri-food chain).

On the other hand, Russia with its structurally weak economy can hardly expect to be able to successfully compete in international markets. (The Russian economy is less than one twentieth of the US and EU economies combined). This fact helps explain why wars for territorial conquests are so appealing to Moscow's leadership (Aslund, 2019). But - as history teaches - wars for territory are always lost in the long run; today, even more so than in the past, it is futile to think, that more territory means more power. (This is well understood by China, whose geopolitical strategy is to conquer markets, not territories). I would like to make a comment on the nuclear issue. Some believe that a transition to (clean) nuclear energy would reduce our dependence on Russia, but this is pure illusion. In fact, the country that produces the most uranium, both natural and enriched, is Russia. According to the

US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2021, 35% of the uranium used by the US came from Kazakhstan and 14% from Russia. The dependency position for EU countries is similar. It is therefore obvious that the suggestion to go nuclear would have the effect of increasing the level of dependence on Russia. Not to mention the very high risk that the close link between civil and military nuclear power could lead to devastating nuclear conflicts. Nor can we think that thermonuclear fusion, which unlike nuclear fission, is 'safe', will be of any help to us, for the simple reason that its deployment would take at least another twenty years or so.

The Ukraine war goes hand in hand with other manifestations that signal the non-zero probability of a future of severe economic and political instability. Economic protectionism and trade wars are escalating and are jeopardizing the geopolitical equilibria that have been consolidated in the "Long Peace" period since after the Cold War. In political terms, nationalism and populism threaten multilateralism. This scenario has even made Francis Fukuyama think that not only should "the end of history" be postponed... but perhaps "the end of the end of history must be admitted" (Fukuyama, 2022). A specific point deserves some attention. With Russia's economy suffering under Western sanctions, both state and private sanctions, some of the country's leading economists are advocating a return to the five-year plans and quantitative production targets – a return, although in a simplified way, to the planned economy of Soviet times. It is not difficult to understand that such a move would represent a real disaster for the future of Russia, since it will decree its substantial exclusion from the global economy (Marder, 2023). The use of state sanctions by non-belligerent nations is not new. The novelty of the Ukrainian War is the presence of massive private sanctions, i.e. sanctions decided by private companies in addition to what is required by state sanctions. More than 1,000 firms have announced that they are cutting back operations in Russia beyond what is required by sanctions. (For the details and for a discussion of the economic implications of a world where private corporations may discontinue profitable business relationships for moral or political reasons, see Hart *et al.*, 2022).

So what are the qualifying points of a proposal aimed at a positive peace agreement? In line with the Final Statement by participants of the Science and Ethics Study Group who met at the Casina Pio IV, Vatican City, on June 6-7, 2022, I would like to indicate seven of them. These points are based on the fundamental premise that there must be another way to peace than to follow a great power logic; that does not believe that only weapons create peace and that does not believe in the famous Cicero's statement: "*Inter pacem et bellum nihil est medium*".

(Between peace and war there is no possible mediation). Indeed, all wars are avoidable, since all human cases are just cases and therefore not necessary.

First. Neutrality of Ukraine renouncing its national ambition to join NATO, but retaining full freedom to become part of the EU, with all that this means. A UN resolution must be adopted to ensure international monitoring mechanisms for compliance with peace agreements.

Second. Ukraine is guaranteed its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; a guarantee provided by the five permanent members of the United Nations (China, France, Russia, UK, USA) as well as the EU and Turkey.

Third. Russia retains *de facto* control of Crimea for a number of years, after which the parties seek, a permanent *de jure* settlement through diplomatic channels. The local communities enjoy facilitated access to both Ukraine and Russia; as well as freedom of movement of people and financial resources.

Fourth. Autonomy of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions within Ukraine, of which they remain an integral part, economically, politically and culturally.

Fifth. Guaranteed access for Russia and Ukraine to Black Sea ports for normal trade activities.

Sixth. Phased removal of Western sanctions on Russia in parallel with the withdrawal of Russian troops and armaments from Ukraine.

Seventh. Creation of a Multilateral Fund for the Reconstruction and Development of the destroyed and seriously damaged areas of Ukraine, a fund to which Russia is called upon to contribute on the basis of predefined proportionality criteria. (The historical experience of the Marshall Plan is helpful in this regard).

I have reason to believe that such a proposal, if properly presented and wisely handled through diplomatic channels, might be favourably received by the parties to the conflict since it is credible – a war of attrition will devastate both sides – and enforceable – given that both sides and the rest of the world will benefit from it. The main point for mediation is that all parties have legitimate interests and legitimate grievances (see Sachs, 2022). Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a negotiated peace is the fear of negotiation itself. Indeed, politicians and government leaders are afraid of being perceived by their *constituencies* either as naive pacifists or as opportunists with ulterior motives (Mardini, 2022, illustrates, in great detail, how the

fear of negotiation has taken shape in the US). This is why, in a situation such as the present one, the role of the peacemakers is crucial. The mobilisation of the international civil society to create an 'Alliance for Peace' is today, an urgent and highly meritorious initiative. On the one hand, it is a matter of re-establishing bonds of mutual trust between states without which no peace can be lasting, and on the other hand, of making people understand that it is not the end that justifies the means, but the permissibility of the means that, together with other conditions, justifies the ends.

In this regard, it is proper to remind ourselves that the UN Charter declares as its main purpose "To maintain international peace and security and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression [...]. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a way that international peace, security and justice are not endangered". The UN Charter assumes that two sides are always involved in any conflict, but that they must be reconciled by peaceful means. In the case of the Ukraine war, it should be admitted that a patent violation of UN Charter, from both sides of the conflict, has been perpetrated. (See von der Schulenburg, 2023, for an accurate reconstruction of the facts supporting the conclusion above).

Conclusion

There are people who study the art of war – as it was called in ancient China – to become better prepared for combat. But there are many others who deal with war to discourage its outbreak, to eliminate it. Peace is not an unattainable goal because war is not something that happens like an earthquake or a tsunami; it is the choice of people who want it. And for this they develop ideologies that teach us to hate: our neighbours, the marginalised, the poor, spreading the culture of aporophobia. War and peace change people's character, clearly in the opposite direction.

At a time when neoliberal policies are in decline everywhere, geopolitical realism is becoming the dominant ideology. At the heart of realist thinking is the 'security dilemma': a situation in which the major powers choose national security as the primary objective of their action. Now, since it is difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive measures, the attempt of one side to become more secure ends up by increasing the insecurity of the other side, thus triggering

countermeasures that feed a real vicious circle. The case of Ukraine is a very clear confirmation of this dilemma.

Plato wrote that the fundamental human need is the need for recognition (*thimos*, in Greek). Every person needs to be recognised by other people and to be recognised in turn in order to give meaning to his or her existence. This is certainly true, but it must be considered that *thimos* can be declined as *megalothimia* or as *isothimia*. While the latter is the need to be recognised as equal to others, *megalothimia* is the need to be recognised as superior to others. It is sad to admit it, but it has to be said that *megalothimia* has been around for some time now in our societies. The will to power, and thus the will to war, finds in this a fertile breeding ground.

If the Ukrainian tragedy served to make us realise the extent of the serious vulnerabilities of the current international order and spur us to act accordingly, we could say that this huge tragedy will have served some good purpose. This would open up hope, not only in the future, but also the present, since our actions, in addition to a final goal, also have a meaning and value here and now.

References

Albertini, M. (1984), "Culture of Peace and Culture of War", *Il Federalista*, 1984, 26.

Arendt, H. (1969), *On Violence*, Harcourt and Brace Jovanovich, London.

Aslund, A. (2019), *Russia's Crony Capitalism. The Path from Market Economy to Kleptocracy*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Blattman, C. (2022), *Why we Fight. The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace*, London, Viking.

Bonhoeffer, D. (2002), "Resistenza e Resa" in *Opere*, Vol.VIII, Brescia, Queriniana.

Cella, G. (2021), *Storia e Geopolitica della Crisi Ucraina. Dalla Rus' di Kiev a oggi*, Rome, Carocci.

Ciò, A. (2022), *Il ricatto del Gas Russo*, Milan, Il Sole 24 Ore.

Cooper, R. (2000), *The Post-Modern State and the World Order*, London.

Cooper, R. (2003), *The Breaking of Nations*, New York.

Dell'Asta, A. (2022), "Le falsificazioni della Guerra". *Vita e Pensiero*, 2, pp.46-58.

Erasmus of Rotterdam (1503), *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, English version by A. O'Donnell, Early English. Text Society, 1981.

Fukuyama, F. (2022), Interview in the March 30, 2022 issue of the *New Statement*.

Galtung, J. and Jacobson, C. (2000), *Searching for Peace*, London, Pluto Press.

Genovesi, A. (1765), *Lezioni di Economia Civile*, Naples.

Genovesi, A. (2020), *La Logica per i Giovanetti*, (orig. ed. 1766), Verona, Gabrielli.

Graziano, M. (2019), *Holy War and Holy Alliance*, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Hart, O.D. et al. (2022), *Private Sanctions*, Becker-Friedman Institute WP 164, December. [Accessible online](#).

Hirschman, A. (1977), *The Passions and the Interests*, Princeton, Princeton UP, 2013.

Holmes, R. (1989), *On War and Morality*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Jangfeldt, B. (2020), *The Russian Idea*, Milan, Neri Pozza.

Lenin, I. (1966), *Opere Complete*, Rome, Editori Riuniti, vol. XXI.

Marder, M. (2023), "Through the Russian Looking Glass", *Project Syndicate*, Jan. 13.

Marini, M. (2020), *La Russia di Putin*, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Masera, R. and Triffin, R., eds., (1984), *Europe's Money*, Oxford, OUP.

Montesquieu (1750), *The Spirit of the Laws*, English version by T. Nugent, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1989.

Mulder, N. (2022), *The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Nardini, R. (2022), "Course Correcting Towards Diplomacy in the Ukraine crisis", *The National Interest*, August.

Sachs, J. (2022), "A Mediator's Guide to Peace in Ukraine", Dec. 5. [Accessible online](#).

Schelling, T. (1960), *The Strategy of Conflict*, Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Von der Schulenburg, M. (2023), *The War in Ukraine and our Obligation to Seek Peace*, Feb. 20. [Accessible online](#).

Snyder, T. (2018), "God is a Russian", *New York Review*, April, 5.

Wright, Q. (1942), *A Study of War*, Chicago, Chicago University Press.